

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 01264

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 5)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV EG IS
SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR JERUSALEM MEETING
REF: (A) STATE 5218, (B) STATE 6679, (C) CAIRO 1126,
- (D) CAIRO 1224

1. SUMMARY: KAMEL AND GHALI REACT NEGATIVELY TO OUR AGENDA PROPOSALS. THEY CONTEND AGENDA OF TYPE WE SUGGEST WILL HURT EGYPT'S IMAGE IN ARAB WORLD. THEY ALSO OBJECT TO A RECOMMENDATION THAT EGYPTIANS BRING SPECIFIC WEST BANK/GAZA IDEAS, NOTING EGYPT HAS NOT BEEN MANDATED TO DO SO. THEY VIEW OUR AGENDA PROPOSALS AS CHANGING ASWAN UNDERSTANDING THAT JERUSALEM TALKS WOULD SIMPLY SEEK TO DEVELOP SOME BROAD GENERAL PRINCIPLES. KAMEL DISTURBED THAT SADAT HAD ACCEPTED OUR AGENDA PROPOSAL, BUT IS GRATIFIED THAT BEGIN TURNDOWN LEAVES QUESTION OPEN. KAMEL INTENDS DISCUSS MATTER DIRECTLY WITH SADAT AND IS A BIT MIFFED THAT I WENT AROUND HIM. HE GAVE ME HIS REPLY TO DAYAN'S COUNTERPROPOSALS AND, DESPITE SADAT'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR AGENDA, ASKED THAT IT BE FORWARDED.

2. AS ARRANGED YESTERDAY WITH SADAT AND VP MUBARAK, I
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 01264 01 OF 02 130422Z

MET WITH FONMIN KAMEL TODAY TO DISCUSS OUR COMPROMISE AGENDA. HE HAD WITH HIM MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI AND HIS CHEF DE CABINET, AHMED MAHER. AS WILL BE SEEN BELOW, KAMEL AND GHALI HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT IDEAS FROM THOSE OF SADAT ON HOW TO PROCEED.

3. IT TRANSPIRED THAT VP MUBARAK HAD TELEPHONED

KAMEL LAST EVENING (A) TO TELL HIM ABOUT OUR PROPOSALS AND (B) TO RAP KAMEL'S KNUCKLES FOR NOT HAVING SENT SADAT THE FULL TEXT OF THE DAYAN COUNTERPROPOSALS. AS A RESULT, KAMEL WAS SLIGHTLY MIFFED. HE DID NOT LIKE THE FACT THAT I HAD GONE AROUND HIM IN PRESENTING OUR AGENDA TO SADAT BEFORE FIRST DISCUSSING IT WITH HIM. I EXPLAINED THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH SADAT, MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO EXPLORE WITH THE PRESIDENT INTENTION TO IGNORE KAMEL AND I HAD ESPECIALLY TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS OUR DEAS WITH KAMEL TODAY. THAT WAS WHY I HAD ASKED FOR THE APPOINTMENT.

4. SINCE KAMEL PROFESSED NOT TO HAVE SEEN OUR PROPOSED AGENDA, I THEN GAVE HIM A COPY. IN DOING SO I POINTED OUT THAT IT IS NO LONGER VALID SINCE PRIMIN BEGIN HAS OBJECTED TO IT. WE ARE NOW IN PROCESS OF CONSIDERING IN AN EFFORT HELP THE PARTIES.

5. AFTER KAMEL AND GHALI HAD READ OUR THREE-POINT AGENDA

, KAMEL SAID HE WAS GLAD IT IS NO LONGER VALID, SINCE HE TOO WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH IT. HE WAS NONPLUSSED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT SADAT HAD ACCEPTED IT. (APPARENTLY MUBARAK HAD FAILED MENTION THIS CRITICAL POINT). AN AGENDA OF THIS TYPE WE PROPOSED, KAMEL ARGUED, WILL ONLY HURT EGYPT'S IMAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD. I DISPUTED THIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 01264 01 OF 02 130422Z

POINT WITH HIM AND WENT THROUGH OUR RATIONALE FOR HAVING DONE WHAT WE DID. HAVING IN MIND THE INABILITY OF THE PARTIES THUS FAR TO BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON AN AGENDA, WE HAD TAKEN WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS THE COMMONALITY FROM THE TWO SIDES' POSITIONS AND MERGED THEM INTO A GENERALIZED, NEUTRAL AGENDA. WE HOPED THIS MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SIDES.

6. I THEN EXPLAINED TO KAMEL AND GHALI OUR CONCEPT ON HOW THE JERUSALEM TALKS MIGHT EVOLVE (PARAS 5-7, REF A), STRESSING THE NEED FOR CONCRETE EGYPTIAN IDEAS ON RESOLVING THE WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUE. WE HOPED THE EGYPTIAN IDEAS WOULD BE AS SPECIFIC AS THOSE IN THE BEGIN PLAN. PERHAPS EGYPTIANS COULD WORK FROM BEGIN PLAN, NOTING POINTS ON WHICH THEY CAN AGREE AND THOSE ON WHICH THEY WISH TO MAKE COUNTERPROPOSALS. I STRESSED OUR BELIEF THAT AN EARLY OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP SERIES OF GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENT ON WEST BANK/GAZA. THESE WOULD DESCRIBE, WITHOUT THE DETAIL OF BEGIN PLAN, THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN A PROCESS FOR DEALING WITH PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN INTERIM PERIOD OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS. FINALLY, TOLD HIM WE THOUGHT IT

MIGHT BE USEFUL IF TALK IN AN INITIAL PERIOD COULD FOCUS
ON (A) DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND (B) GUIDELINES FOR
NEGOTIATING WEST BANK/GAZA ARRANGEMENTS
FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS. WE PLAN TO BRING FORMULATION IN BOTH
AREAS IN THE TALKS AND HOPE EGYPT WILL DO LIKEWISE.

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 01264 02 OF 02 130520Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 01264

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PREVIOUSLY OMMITTED IN PARAS 8 & 11
)

7. IT WAS CLEAR THAT KAMEL/GHALI VIEWS ARE DIFFERENT.
KAMEL CLAIMED OUR SUGGESTION FOR CONCRETE WEST BANK/GAZA
IDEAS OR A DETAILED PLAN RUNS COUNTER TO WHAT HAD BEEN
AGREED UPON DURING ASWAN TALKS, NAMELY THAT JERUSALEM
TALKS WOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP SOME BROAD GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
GHALI CHIMED IN TO ARGUE THAT GOE HARDLY IN A POSITION TO
PROVIDE CONCRETE IDEAS ON WEST BANK/GAZA. IT HAS NO
MANDATE FROM PLO OR WEST BANK/GAZA PALESTINIANS TO DO SO.
TO ATTEMPT THIS WILL ONLY SUBJECT GOE TO FURTHER ARAB
CRITICISM AS EXCEEDING ITS AUTHORITY. WHAT IS NEEDED,
SOME TERM SIMILAR TO "SELF-DETERMINATION" APPEARS SO THAT
GOE CAN MAKE THE POINT TO ITS ARAB CRITICS THAT THE
LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY
PROTECTED. WITHOUT THIS, THE TALKS WILL COME TO NOTHING.
HE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS HAD BEEN AGREED
UPON AT ASWAN TALKS AND WAS DISTURBED THAT OUR POSITION
SEEMED TO BE CHANGING.

8. I TOLD KAMEL/GHALI THAT IN TRYING TO FIND SIMPLIFIED
AGENDA FORMULATION, WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO RESTRICT EITHER
OF THE PARTIES FROM TABLING ITS REQUIREMENTS. WE DO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 01264 02 OF 02 130520Z

BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF DEMONSTRABLY CONTENTIOUS PHRASEOLOGY SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN AGENDA DISCUSSIONS AND TALKS SHOULD FOCUS ON CONCRETE ISSUES. I REITERATED THAT UNDER THE TYPE OF AGENDA FORMULATION WE ARE CONSIDERING, NO PARTICIPANT WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM PUTTING FORTH HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

9. WHILE ACCEPTING THE POSITIVE NATURE OF OUR PURPOSE, KAMEL/GHALI REMAINED UNHAPPY ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ABOUT. WITH THE TYPE OF SIMPLIFIED AGENDA THAT WE HAD PROPOSED, KAMEL INSISTED, THE JERUSALEM MEETING WILL COME TO NOTHING ECHOING THESE VIEWS, GHALI WONDERED IF IT IS BETTER TO HAVE TEN DAYS OF TALKS THAT END WITH NOTHING OR TO CALL OFF THE WHOLE MEETING BECAUSE NOTHING WILL COME OF IT. I SOUGHT TO BUCK THEM UP. TOLD THEM IT MIGHT INDEED BE TOUGH SLEDDING, BUT THAT WE ARE CONVINCED PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE. IF WE WERE NOT, SECRETARY VANCE WOULD NOT BE COMING. KAMEL REMAINED CHEERLESS. AT ONE POINT HE LAMENTED, "SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM--NO RESULTS; CAIRO CONFERENCE--NO RESULTS; ISMAILIA MINI-SUMMIT--NO RESULTS; AND NOW WE WILL SEE THE SAME IN CAIRO MILITARY AND JERUSALEM POLITICAL TALKS." UNLESS USG WEIGHS IN TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT FAILURE IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. I ASSURED HIM WE WILL DO OUR PART, BUT IT ALSO UP TO EGYPT TO ADOPT POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH.

10. KAMEL REMAINED DISTURBED THAT SADAT HAD ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL AND SAID HE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS OUR APPROACH DIRECTLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. IN THE MEANTIME, HE HAD ASKED THAT WE CONVEY IT TO THE ISRAELIS (BEING SENT BY SEPTTEL). HE WANTED THIS DONE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SADAT HAD CONCLUDED GAP BETWEEN TWO SIDES TOO BIG TO BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 01264 02 OF 02 130520Z

BRIDGED AND HAD WELCOMED AND ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSED COMPROMISE AGENDA. I ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT HE WISHED US DROP OUR EFFORTS TO HELP FORMULATE SUITABLE AGENDA AND PREFERRED TO CONTINUE EXCHANGES WITH ISRAELIS IN HOPE OF ARRIVING AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE AGENDA. GHALI THOUGHT WE SHOULD CONTINUE ON A PARALLEL BASIS. KAMEL WAS DISCUSS THE WHOLE MATTER WITH SADAT BEFORE GIVING ANY ANSWER.

11. COMMENT: KAMEL AND GHALI, WHATEVER THEIR MERITS, VIEW PROBLEM IN NARROWEST TERMS. KAMEL IN PARTICULAR SEEMS TO BELIEVE OUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT A CHANGE FROM ASWAN UNDERSTANDINGS. I ASSURED HIM THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN WHAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS AND THAT OUR PROPOSALS SIMPLY REFLECT OUR THOUGHTS ON HOW WE CAN BEST ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULTS. I SUSPECT KAMEL WILL MAKE STRONG EFFORT CAUSE SADAT TO HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ON THIS MATTER, BUT STILL BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED ALONG LINES SUGGESTED REFTTEL C. EILTS

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